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The United States Airborne D ivisions, and Their Role on June 6,1944 
By Dennis Carey ‘07
I
The United States Airborne Divisions that were dropped behind Utah Beach in the 
early morning hours o f June 6,1944 played a critical role in the eventual success of 
Operation Overlord. On the evening of June 5th, General Eisenhower visited the men of 
the 101st Airborne division as they geared up in preparation for their jump. In making his 
rounds among the troops giving his words of encouragement, a paratrooper remarked 
“Hell, we ain’t worried General. It’s the Krauts that ought to be worrying now.”1 This is 
just one example of the confidence and fortitude that the men of both the 82nd and 101st 
Airborne divisions possessed on the eve of Operation Overlord. Characteristics such as 
these would prove to be invaluable as they flew over Hitler’s Atlantic Wall and 
parachuted into Nazi occupied France. Despite their optimism, most of the men of the 
Airborne would soon be faced with countless setbacks—setbacks that began before they 
even jumped out of their transport planes.
Things began to go wrong as soon as they began to approach the French coastline. 
On their approach to the designated drop zones the transport planes carrying the 
paratroopers planned to fly in a tight formation, dropping the men in a set pattern that 
would allow for quick assembly into an effective fighting force. Guiding the planes to 
their assigned drop zones would be seven teams of pathfinders. These pathfinders were 
specially trained and sent in ahead of the main force; at about midnight on June 6th they 
would become the first allied soldiers to hit the ground in Nazi controlled France. They 
carried with them beacons that were intended to guide the inbound transports to their 
targets. Upon landing, the pathfinders found that they had not been dropped where they 
intended, as Clay Blair notes in his book Ridgway’s Paratroopers. “Only two of the 
seven teams came down in precisely the right place. Owing to navigational and other 
errors, some pathfinders were dropped as far as two miles off target, errors that would
1 Ambrose, Stephen A. 1994. D-Day June 6  1944: The Climactic Battle of World War it . New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 193.
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have grave consequences.”2 The first wave o f aircraft carrying both the 82nd and 101st 
followed the route of the pathfinders towards their drop zones at about 1:00 AM on June 
6th, expecting to be led by the pathfinders beacons. Most o f the planes found no beacons 
at all. They were not aware that the many of the pathfinder’s objectives were not yet 
accomplished—mainly because they were ordered to be under strict radio silence.
The men flying the transports were the pilots o f the Army Air Force’s Troop 
Carrier Command. For many it was their first combat mission. They had not been trained 
to deal with night operations, anti-aircraft fire, or foul weather.3 As they came over 
France, all hell broke loose. They encountered cloudbanks which decreased their 
visibility to nearly nothing, along with heavy anti-aircraft fire from the Germans on the 
ground. Many of the ill-prepared pilots broke their tight V formations and took evasive 
action, essentially throwing the airborne divisions into chaos before they could even hit 
the ground. Instead o f being dropped in their planned drop zones, there were two entire 
divisions of paratroopers scattered over several miles throughout the Normandy 
countryside.
The two airborne divisions being dropped each had their own objectives upon 
landing. The 82nd Airborne Division was to be dropped into three zones around the town 
of Ste. Mere Eglise and the adjacent Merderet River. Their two main objectives were to 
secure the town, which lay to the north of their proposed drop zones, and to move to 
destroy bridges over the Douve River to protect the flank o f the invasion force. Their 
commanding officer was General Matthew Ridgway; Operation Overlord was only his 
fifth parachute jump; it would certainly be a trial by fire. The 101st Airborne Division was 
also supposed to be dropped into three zones, further east and closer to Utah Beach than 
the 82nd. They were to secure the causeways that crossed the marsh behind Utah Beach 
and also move to the south toward Carentan to seize key bridges. They were under the 
command o f General Max Taylor.
Both of the airborne divisions would only be mildly successful in achieving their 
planned objectives on D-Day, and they each would face many of the same problems. One 
problem many paratroopers encountered was the loss of their equipment during the jump: 
many of the pilots had not slowed-down enough, causing more intense shock upon the 
opening o f the parachutes which in turn caused essential gear to be ripped off. Another 
unanticipated problem was a large flooded area around the Merderet River into which 
elements of the 82nd were dropped. The Germans intentionally flooded the area, however 
reconnaissance had mistaken it for solid ground. Thirty-six paratroopers o f the 82nd 
would drown in the marsh, while others were forced to abandon their gear to escape.4 A 
typical paratrooper was wearing between 125 and 150 pounds of gear strapped to his 
body, which made it much harder to move upon landing.5 Some troopers found 
themselves alone when they reached the ground; many were dropped from altitudes that 
caused them to land extremely spread out. Troops in both divisions would encounter this 
problem, and in some cases elements of the 82nd and the 101st became mixed due to miss
2 Blair, Clay. 1985. Ridgway's Paratroopers, the American Airborne in World War II. Garden City, New 
York: The Dial Press, 217.
3 Ambrose, 198.
4 Ambrose, 214.
5 Blair, 219.
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drops. Soldiers were forced to band together and work individually or in small units 
towards their rally points.
Following the first waves o f parachutists, at roughly 3:00 AM more C-47s began 
to arrive towing behind them glider-borne troops of both the 82nd and 101st. Sixty-nine of 
these gliders landed in the area o f Ranville, reinforcing the 101st, forty-nine landed safely 
in a zone cleared by the paratroopers earlier. Simultaneously fifty-two gliders landed six 
kilometers from Ste. Mere Eglise, intended to reinforce the 82nd. These gliders had many 
problems when attempting to land—the clearings in which they were to land were much 
too small. They also encountered massive hedgerows, which many of the gliders slid into 
upon landing causing great damage. The glider force would go on to have twenty-five 
men killed, one hundred eighteen wounded, and fourteen missing out of nine hundred 
fifty-seven total men. The glider troops of the 82nd took sixteen percent casualties before 
it even was in action.6 Many o f these came due to the poor reconnaissance that did not 
consider the size of the Norman hedgerows and the German defenses in the area.
Of the two divisions, the 101st was in much better shape than the 82nd in the early 
morning hours of June 6th. The 101st was able to quickly move towards their objective 
behind Utah Beach. Twenty-four hours after the drop, the 101st had assembled only about 
2,500 of the 6,000 men who had jumped. They had taken Ste. Martin de Varreville along 
with Pouppeville, which were both key to the breakout of troops landing on the beach. 
Elements o f the 101st were also moving towards Carentan, which General Omar Bradley 
hoped could be taken by D+l [the day after D-Day],
Although their force was more scattered, elements of the 82nd were also able to 
make headway. O f all of the troops jumping on D-Day, the 505th Parachute Infantry of 
the 82nd had one of the best jumps. In the book O ut o f  the Blue, James Huston explains 
why this occurred: “Its troop carrier planes too had been scattered, but many o f them 
were able to circle back and find the drop zone which the pathfinders had clearly 
marked.”7 The dangerous decision to circle back allowed for about 180 men, under the 
command of Lt. Col. Ed Krause, to assemble.
By 4:00 AM Krause was moving toward Ste. Mere Eglise. He was guided by a 
French man into town, who pointed out the locations of the defending Germans. Some 
thirty Germans surrendered to Krause and his men, while ten were killed resisting.8 At 
4:30 AM, Krause hoisted the American flag on a church steeple in Ste. Mere Eglise. 
Americans had liberated their first town in France since 1918.9 Despite being the only 
airborne unit to achieve one of its objectives, the 82nd was still much slower to assemble. 
Two days after jumping, they had only 2,100 men under unified command.10 Without the 
success of the pathfinders that marked the landing area of the 505th or the fortitude of the 
pilots who chose to circle back instead o f simply dropping the men, the 82nd Airborne 
division probably would not have accomplished any o f its objectives on D-Day. This is a 
prime example of what the paratroopers could have accomplished had their drops gone as 
planned.
6 Ambrose, 219-221.
7 Huston, James A. 1972. Out of the Blue, US Army Airborne Operations in World War II. West Lafayette, 
Indiana: Purdue University Studies, 183.
8 Ambrose, 237.
9 Gilbert, Martin. 2004. D-Day. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 141.
10 Huston, 183.
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As groups of soldiers came together all across the Norman countryside, they were 
forced to make due with what they had and do whatever it took to link up into larger 
groups. There was little to no chain of command; it was the responsibility o f the Junior 
Officers and enlisted men to act independently to link up into larger forces. For many of 
these soldiers, Overlord was their first combat jump; American soldiers were not 
professionals, but rather citizen soldiers that may have been young teenagers when Hitler 
took over France. They were faced with a situation for which they had not trained, and 
were forced to improvise in many situations. In their briefings prior to their jumps they 
were instructed to do whatever they could to disrupt the Germans, and they did just that.
“The overall missions o f the three airborne divisions were to disrupt and confuse 
the Germans so as to prevent a concentrated counterattack against the seaborne troops 
coming in at dawn, and to protect the flanks,”11 is Stephen Ambrose’ description o f the 
universal objective of the airborne troops from his book D-Day. The men o f the airborne 
did exactly that on June 6,1944. They had clear objectives, but it became very clear to 
nearly all o f the men that their objectives were largely unattainable due to the scattered 
nature in which they were dropped.
Many units began to render the German lines of communication useless in their 
efforts to cause havoc behind the German lines. The Germans had been firmly in place in 
France for almost five years, and in that time they had grown reliant on more secure land 
communication lines rather than radio. When the men o f the airborne began to cut as 
many telephone lines as they possibly could, it isolated some German units and left them 
out of contact with their commands. These isolated units were unsure of what was 
happening, and were caught off-guard by the paratroopers. Without contact to their high 
command, they were forced to wait for other avenues of communication to be established 
before taking drastic action. This confusion bought the paratroopers much needed time to 
organize.
Since the paratroopers were so scattered, it was hard for the defending Germans to 
discern how many o f them actually landed. Sightings of US soldiers all across Normandy 
in varying strengths confused the Germans. In addition to not being sure o f where the 
main drop was, the Germans were thrown off by a diversion called Operation Titanic. 
Titanic consisted o f about 12 commandos, along with about 1,000 dummy parachutists 
that were dropped southeast o f Omaha Beach. The commandos were armed with 
recordings of chatter and small arms fire that they played over loudspeakers. The German 
unit in that section, the 915th Infantry, moved not toward the invasion beaches but the 
“allied force” near Isigny. Only two of the twelve commandos would survive the action.12
By the time the 915th Infantry realized where the real landings were, the Allies 
had already established a strong beachhead and were moving inland. Operation Titanic 
was just one of the many deceptions that were put forward to confuse the German 
defenders and make the job of the American paratroopers easier. The German high 
command knew an invasion was coming, and many of them mistakenly felt that the 
invasion at Normandy was not the invasion.13 This blunder would allow the Allies to 
breach the Atlantic Wall and establish a firm beachhead on the Normandy coast. From
11 Ambrose, 227.
12 Gilbert, 130-131
13 Ambrose, 303.
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that beachhead would flow an amazing volume of allied men and firepower that would 
open Hitler’s dreaded second front, and eventually penetrate deep into Nazi territory.
The United States Airborne forces that landed in Normandy on June 6,1944 truly 
played an integral role in Operation Overlord. It is realized that there were many 
shortcomings in the parachute drops of the 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions; both units 
still contributed to Allied victory at Normandy. The 82nd, despite being scattered, 
managed to take Ste. Mere Eglise and hold it until they were supported by seaborne 
tanks. The 101st was successful in opening up the causeways behind Utah Beach and 
taking out key German artillery batteries.
Although neither division of the U.S. Airborne was successful in all of their initial 
objectives, they accomplished their overall mission to disrupt the Germans and cause 
confusion behind their lines. The Airborne troop divisions were elite units that were 
highly trained and superbly equipped, and they proved their value on D-Day and in the 
campaign following it. By June 11, D + 5 ,17,400 paratroopers and glidertroops had 
landed in Normandy. The airborne divisions continued to fight as ground units in 
Normandy following D-Day for thirty-three more days, until being relieved on July 8th.14 
Both divisions of United State parachutists would serve bravely in the campaign for 
Normandy. The men of the airborne, from Privates to Generals, would continue to 
impress the Allied high command with their improvisational skills in Operation Overlord 
and many subsequent campaigns in the liberation of Nazi-occupied Europe.
14 Huston, 186.
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